. .
Nash Equilibrium II 6 / 43 min x 1 θ 1 (x 1 , x −1 )
x N ∈ X N Short History
/ 43
I Prehistory:
N Cournot (1838) N von Neumann (1928) N von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) I Nash (1950/1) =⇒ Nash Equilibrium Problem I Debreu (1952) Arrow and Debreu (1954) =⇒ Generalized Nash Eq.
I 1954-beginning of the 1990s: The GNEP is studied mainly within the economic domain I From the 1990s, modern engineering applications:
N Robinson (1993, effectiveness in combat models) N Scotti (1995, structural design) N liberalized markets, telecommunications, web protocols, pollution analysis....
Arrow and Debreu's economic model
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The economic equilibrium model: how are commodities produced and exchanged among individuals?
Walras was probably the first author to tackle this issue in a modern mathematical perspective.
Arrow and Debreu considered a general economic system along with a corresponding definition of equilibrium. They then showed that the equilibria of their model are those of a suitably defined GNEP; on this basis, they were able to prove important results on the existence of economic equilibria.
Arrow and Debreu's economic model II
I The production-player's problem:
The consumption-player's problem:
I The market-players problem:
PART II Algorithms Given a GNEP ⇓ Transform it into another (better understood) problem X Solve problem X
Two warnings
I In order to solve problem X one must impose some conditions; when these conditions are "brought back" to the original GNEP setting they are often very strong or not very often verified in practice (or both)
I There is too little practical experience in the solution of GNEPs to be able to make a serious comparison of the practical behavior of various methods
Using the KKT conditions
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Assume the feasible sets are explicitly given by a set of parametric inequalities
We can write down the KKT conditions for each player
Concatenate the KKT systems of all players and try to solve Very recently some theoretical results based on an homothopy approach
Solve the resulting NEP
The Jointly Convex Case
For an important class of GNEPs some other possibilities arise Let K ⊂ ℜ n be closed and convex
Solve the GNEP.
The solutions of the VI are called normalized equilibria x N x ν = packets sent to buffer by player ν
This is a jointly convex GNEP
is strongly monotone and its unique solution is (3/4, 1/4); this is the normalized equilibrium of the GNEP.
Having reduced the (G)NEP to a VI we must pay attention.
The assumptions needed for the convergence of VI algorithms are often very strong (if not meaningless) when "translated" back into the (G)NEP environment For example, a condition often invoked for the convergence of VI algorithms is that F be monotone. These means assuming that
be positive semidefinite. Is this sensible?
Nikaido-Isoda based methods
The mapping
is called the Nikaido-Isoda function. Each summand gives the improvement that the ν-th player gets when changing (unilaterally) from x ν to y ν . Define the nonnegative function
Solve the problem min x∈K V (x) in order to get a normalized equilibrium
Note that in general V is nondifferentiable and difficult to compute Specialized methods can be developed, the most important one being the relaxation method. Also regularized (differentiable) versions exist.
Relaxation method Pros:
I It is probably the method that has been used most in practice I Conceptually does not require the differentiability of the θ ν 
We assume throughout "sufficient" differentiability of all functions involved Important: the 3-norm is used, so that the penalty term is continuously differentiable at all infeasible points
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Two main issues:
I How to choose and/or update the penalty parameter ρ I How to solve the (unconstrained) penalized problems
We decouple completely these two issues.
How to update ρ I
In order to deal with the updating of the penalty parameter ρ we assume temporarily that an iterative algorithm A is available that, given a point x k , generates a new point
We make the following absolutely natural blanket assumption on A.
For every x 0 , the sequence {x k } obtained by x k+1 = A[x k ] is such that every limit point (if any) is a solution of the unconstrained penalized problem.
All results on the updating below hold whatever the algorithm A If, for any value of the penalty parameters ρ ν , we find a solution of the penalized problem that is also feasible for the original constrained problem, then this is a solution of original constrained problem. We try to force feasibility by increasing the penalty parameters.
If a solutionx of the penalty problem is not feasible for player ν, then P ν (x, ρ ν ) is continuously differentiable atx so that
The idea of the updating scheme is to detect when this "dangerous" situation occurs (see the test at
Step 2), and to increase the value of the penalty parameter in this case
Updating Scheme
Data: x 0 ∈ R n and ρ ν > 0 for all ν = 1, . . . , N . Set k := 0.
Step 1: If x k is a solution of the GNEP: STOP.
Step 2:
For every ν ∈ I k , if
then double the penalty parameters ρ ν .
Step 3: Compute x k+1 = A[x k ], set k ← k + 1, and go to Step 1.
Let {x k } be the sequence generated by Updating Scheme. If the penalty parameters are updated a finite number of times only, then every limit pointx of this sequence is a solution of the GNEP If instead some penalty parameters grow to infinity and the sequence {x k } is bounded, then, for each ν such that ρ ν → ∞, there is a limit pointx for which one of the following assertions is true:
(a)x ν is a global minimizer of the constraint violation g ν + (·,x −ν ) 3 with g ν + (x ν ,x −ν ) 3 > 0; (b)x ν is Fritz John point for the player's problem, but not a solution of it (c)x ν is an optimal solution for the player's problem.
Our next aim is giving conditions ensuring that (a), (b) and (c) cannot occur, so that the ρ ν remain finite and every limit point is a solution of the GNEP We need some constraint qualifications
We say that the GNEP satisfies the constraint qualification CQ 3 at a pointx if
• We say that the GNEP satisfies the EMFCQ at a pointx if, for every player ν = 1, . . . , N , there exists a vector d ν such that
where
How to update ρ VI
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Assume that the sequence {x k } generated by Updating Scheme is bounded. Consider the following assertions:
(a) The EMFCQ holds at every limit pointx of {x k }; (b) The CQ 3 condition holds at every limit pointx of {x k }; (c) The penalty parameters are updated a finite number of times only Then the following implications hold:
The algorithm A I
Our algorithm A is based on smoothing. Recall that the objectives functions of the penalized game are
. We approximate these functions by the smooth mappings
where ε > 0
The algorithm A II
We approximate the nonsmooth penalized game by the unconstrained smooth (actually C 2 ) game where each player's problem isP ν instead of P ν . The solutions of this smoothed game are the solutions of the following system of equations:
Let {ε k } and {η k } be two sequences of positive numbers converging to 0 and, for every k, let x(ε k ) be a point such that
Then every limit point of the sequence x(ε k ) is a solution of the nonsmooth penalized game
On this basis we can, roughly speaking, use any standard method for the solution of a smooth system of equations as algorithm A.
The one theoretical problem we are left to deal with is "Can we ensure that we are able to solve the smooth systems F ε (x) = 0?"
We do not actually need to solve these systems at each iteration but eventually we want to get more and more accurate solutions. While the approach seems to work very well in practice, this theoretical issue is still under investigation.
Data: x 0 ∈ R n , ρ ν > 0, ε 0 > 0, S > 0 and integer. Set k := 0.
Step 1: If x k is such that
; then STOP.
then double the penalty parameter ρ ν .
Step 3: Perform at most S steps of an equation solver to the nonlinear system of equations F ε k (x) = 0. Let x k+1 be the final iterate of this equation solver. If F ε k (x k+1 ) ≤ 1000ε k , set ε k+1 = 0.1ε k , otherwise let ε k+1 := ε k . Set k ← k + 1, and go to Step 1. 
